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Abstract
The article presents key issues relating to the methods of mobile termination rates 
calculation by the Polish National Regulatory Agency (NRA): the UKE President. It 
analyses the provisions of Polish telecommunications law of 20041 with respect to the 
rights and obligations of the UKE President. It invokes specific cases showing how 
problematic rates calculation is for mobile operators. The Polkomtel, PTK Centertel, 
PTC sp. z o.o. cases clearly show how unclear the calculation process may be in 
practice and illustrate how broad the discretionary powers of the UKE President 
are in this respect on the grounds of Polish telecommunications law. Highlighted 
is also the dispute between the Polish NRA and the European Commission. Even 
though the UKE President acts on the grounds of Polish law, its actions have to be 
compliant with the European telecoms package and take into utmost account the 
recommendations and comments issued by the European Commission. 
Resumé
L’article présent les questions clés concernant les méthodes du calcul des tarifs de 
terminaison mobile par l’Agence Nationale de la Régulation Polonaise: le Président 
de l’UKE. Il analyse les provisions du droit de la télécommunication polonais de 
2004 par rapport aux droits et obligations du président de l’UKE. Il décrit des cas 
spécifiques pour montrer la complexité du calcul des tarifs par les opérateurs des 
réseaux de téléphonie mobile. Les cas de Polkomtel, PTK Centertel, PTC sp. z o.o. 
prouvent que le processus du calcul n’est pas claire en pratique et que le pouvoir 
discrétionnaire du président de l’UKE, fondé sur le droit de la télécommunication 
polonais, est très vaste. L’article souligne aussi la dispute entre l’ANR polonaise et 
la Commission Européenne. 
Classifications and key words: telecommunication; mobile operators; mobile termi-
nation rates (MTR); consultation process; notification process; recommendations; 
European Commission; UKE.
I. Introduction
Mobile Termination Rates (hereafter, MTRs) are systematically reduced by 
the Polish National Regulatory Authority (hereafter, NRA), which should, in 
the opinion of the telecoms regulator, decrease customer prices. The reductions 
in the MTRs influence the incomes of telecoms operators and their financial 
results. The European Commission has criticized the Polish NRA a number 
of times in 2010 and 2011 for its very slow and largely unjustified approach to 
1 Act of 16/07/04 on Telecommunication Law, Journal of Laws No. 171, item 1800, as 
amended.
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the MTRs, which is meant to ensure symmetry and cost-oriented calculation 
in particular with respect to newcomers. In the Commission’s opinion, the 
approach of the Polish NRA is on occasion not compliant with the principles 
of the Access and Framework Directive. 
Mobile termination rates are defined as the wholesale prices which mobile 
operators charge to other mobile or fixed operators for terminating calls on 
their respective networks. Mobile termination rates fall under the competences 
of the Polish National Regulatory Agency (hereafter, NRA) – President 
of the Electronic Communications Office (in Polish: Urząd Komunikacji 
Elektronicznej; hereafter, UKE). The UKE President has in the past imposed 
remedies for regulating MTRs on three mobile operators active on the Polish 
market: Polkomtel S.A. (Polkomtel), Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa sp. z o.o. (PTC) 
and Polska Telefonia Komórkowa Centertel sp. z o.o. (PTK Centertel). These 
remedies included obligations to provide access on a transparent and non-
discriminatory basis and the use of rates based on actual costs incurred by these 
operators. The European Commission stressed however that MTRs should be 
set according to the costs of an efficient operator providing the relevant service. 
Pursuant to the Commission Recommendation on the Regulatory Treatment 
of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in EU2 (hereafter, the Termination 
Rates Recommendation), the setting of a common approach based on an 
efficient cost standard and the application of symmetrical termination rates 
would promote efficiency, sustainable competition and maximize consumer 
benefits in terms of price and service offerings. The Commission recognizes 
also that, in a competitive environment, operators would compete on the basis 
of current costs and would not be compensated for costs which have been 
incurred through inefficiencies. Historical cost figures need to be adjusted 
therefore to current ones in order to reflect the costs of an efficient operator 
employing modern technology. They must then be adjusted to the bottom up 
Long Run Incremental Cost mode (LRIC bottom-up model) that will be used 
by the Polish NRA from 2013.
The Termination Rates Recommendation derive from Directive 2002/19/
EC of the European Parliament and Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, 
and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated 
facilities3 (hereafter, the Access Directive). Pursuant to Article 13 of the 
Access Directive, all NRAs should ensure that any pricing methodology to be 
mandated in their countries helps promote efficiency, sustainable competition 
and maximizes consumer benefits. According to Article 8(3) of the Directive 
2 Commission Recommendation of 7 May 2009 on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and 
Mobile Termination Rates in the EU C(2009) 3359 final.
3 OJ [2002] L 108/7.
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2002/21/EC (hereafter, Framework Directive)4, the NRAs should also 
contribute to the development of the common market by cooperating with 
each other and with the Commission in order to ensure consistent regulatory 
practice in the telecoms field.
II. Legal basis
There are two possible scenarios for regulation regarding telecommunication 
access: at the request and ex officio. These two ways of concluding the access 
agreement are described in details below. 
1. On request intervention as to the telecommunications access agreement
Pursuant to Article 26 of the Polish telecommunications law (in Polish: 
Prawo Telekomunikacyjne; hereafter, PT), a public telecoms network operator 
should conduct negotiations regarding the conclusion of an access agreement 
at the request of another telecoms operator. The purpose of such telecoms 
access agreements is to provide publicly available telecoms services and 
ensure their interoperability. The UKE President may interfere with civil law 
relationships between the parties involved or undertake actions ex officio in 
that respect only in situations clearly specified by the law.
Under Article 27 PT, the UKE President may specify, on a written request 
submitted by any of the parties to the negotiations (for the conclusion of 
a telecoms access agreement) or ex officio by means of a resolution, a time limit 
within which the negotiations must be closed. This period cannot be longer 
than 90 days from the day of the submission of the request for the conclusion 
of a telecoms access agreement. Where negotiations were not taken up, the 
party obliged to grant telecoms access refuses to do so, or the agreement is not 
concluded within the time limit set by the UKE President, any of the parties 
may submit to the NRA a request for the issuance of a decision on any of the 
contentious issues or to determine the conditions of cooperation. Such request 
should include a draft of the telecoms access agreement and mark the areas 
in the agreement upon which the parties were not able to agree.
Pursuant to Article 28 PT, the Polish NRA should make its telecoms access 
decision within 90 days of the date of the submission of the written request 
by any of the parties to the contested negotiations, taking account of the 
following criteria:
4 OJ [2002] L 108/33.
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i. interest of telecoms network users;
ii. obligations imposed on telecoms undertakings;
iii. promotion of modern telecoms services;
iv.  nature of the contentious issues that arose during the negotiations 
and the practical possibility of implementing solutions related to the 
technical and economic aspects of telecoms access, both those proposed 
by the negotiating telecoms undertakings and those constituting 
alternative solutions; 
v. ensuring:
 – integrity of the network and interoperability of services,
 – non-discriminatory conditions of telecoms access,
 – development of a competitive market for telecoms services;
vi.  market power of those telecoms undertakings whose networks are 
being interconnected;
vii. public interest, including environmental protection;
viii. maintaining the uninterrupted provision of universal services.
The UKE President has the right to interfere with the parties’ negotiations 
in order to facilitate them and the time limit set to finalize them. Nevertheless, 
this right should not be understood broadly and thus should be used only as 
an exception to the general freedom of contracts rule. Additionally, pursuant 
to Article 28(5) PT, in cases where the parties conclude a telecoms agreement, 
the regulatory decision on telecoms access expires by virtue of the law in parts 
covered by the agreement ultimately concluded.
According to Article 43a PT which came into force at the end of 2010, 
operators holding Significant Market Power (hereafter, SMP), and thus forced 
to fulfil certain regulatory obligations relating to telecoms access, may request 
the UKE President to approve further conditions and details of the remedies 
that can support the main obligations imposed on the operator by the Polish 
NRA. These entities are also authorised to propose other conditions of their 
telecoms activity and negotiate them with the UKE President, whereby the 
latter can request any further information subject to that entity’s proposal. 
The NRA will assess whether the proposition will have a positive impact 
on market competition, development and efficient use of modern telecoms 
infrastructure, and whether it improves the quality of services for end-users. 
The UKE President is obliged to issue such a decision within 90 days of 
receiving an appropriate submission. An administrative decision which accepts 
such (negotiated) provisions is binding on the requesting party5 and the NRA 
5 By contrast, previously negotiated agreement between the NRA and the incumbent fixed 
operator (TP S.A.) on the details and conditions of implementation of its regulatory obligations 
is non-binding, based on voluntary commitments. The UKE President cannot thus enforce 
it by way of fines. Its implementation is based on mutual undertakings: TPSA’s agreement 
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is authorised to impose a fine if the latter fails to perform or improperly 
performs the obligations assigned to it during this procedure and confirmed 
in the form of a regulatory decision issued by the UKE President.
2. UKE decisions issued ex officio 
As was mentioned above there are two different grounds for commencing 
a regulatory procedure in the Polish telecoms field: a request submitted by an 
interested party or ex officio. In the first situation, the NRA may take actions 
on a party’s request either if the opposing party fails to start the negotiations 
or if the sides fail to reach an agreement within the time frame indicated by the 
UKE President. In the second situation, the NRA is entitled on the grounds 
of Article 29 PT to modify ex officio, by means of an administrative decision, 
the content of a telecoms access agreement or to oblige the parties to the 
agreement to modify it themselves. Changes of that type can be forced upon 
the parties in cases justified by the need to protect end-user interests and to 
ensure effective competition or interoperability. This particular competence of 
the UKE President limits therefore the freedom of contract normally enjoyed 
by private parties. As a result, it should be exercised with restraint, that is, 
only in the aforementioned situations specified in the provisions of the Polish 
telecommunications law.
The two aforementioned proceedings are conducted for different reasons. 
Decisions based on Articles 27 and 28 PT are issued in order to lead to the 
conclusion of a telecoms access agreement or its modification; decisions based 
on Article 29 PT focus on the protection of the public interests. 
3. Consultation requirement and exceptions thereto
According to Article 15 PT, the UKE President should, prior to taking 
a regulatory decision, and in particular those concerning telecoms access, carry 
out consultation proceedings which allow the parties concerned to express in 
writing their opinions about the draft within a specified time frame. The UKE 
President may issue a decision concerning telecoms access without carrying 
out a consultation only in exceptional cases, which require urgent actions to 
be taken by the NRA due to a direct and serious threat to competition or 
to end-user interests. Such decision cannot however apply for more than 6 
to introduce a range of behavioural commitments, and NRA’s withholding from a functional 
separation of the incumbent.
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months (an ‘interim’ decision). The issuance of other decisions in the same 
case shall be preceded by consultation proceedings.
III. Facts of the case
1. The first round of UKE decisions
The UKE President identified in 2006 three leading Mobile Network 
Operators (hereafter, MNOs): Polkomtel, PTK Centernel and PTC as holding 
SMP. The NRA proceeded to impose on all three of those MNOs the following 
regulatory obligations: transparency, non-discrimination, network access 
and price control (prices based on costs incurred). Subsequently, the UKE 
President questioned the justification for the levels of the cost-based fees as 
presented by the MNOs and their auditors. As a result, the NRA imposed on 
the aforementioned operators another regulatory obligation: to adjust their 
MTRs to the level determined in the glide path formulated by the Polish NRA 
for the years 2007–2010. 
The UKE President imposed therefore on the three MNOs an obligation 
deriving from Article 40 PT in relation to the calculation of access fees based 
on the costs actually incurred by the operators. In the decisions issued in 
2007, the UKE President determined a 3 year schedule for the lowering of the 
rates to last until 1 May 2010 (MTRs 2007 Decisions6). Cost reductions were 
planned to be spread over time so the MNOs could modify appropriately their 
respective retail and wholesale offers. As a result of the MTRs 2007 Decisions, 
the three key Polish mobile operators were obliged to present annually to the 
NRA a cost justification for the MTRs used in their networks. 
In 2008, in other words only one year after the issuance of the original 
decisions, the UKE President changed the aforementioned glide path which 
was originally supposed to be binding until 2010. The new decisions was issued 
(MTRs 2008 Decisions7) which set the rates as follows: between 01 January 
6 MTRs 2007 Decisions: decision of the UKE President of 26 April 2007, DRTH-
WKO-6042-7/06(19) (MTR 2007 Polkomtel); decision of the UKE President of 26 April 2007, 
DRTH-WKO-6042-11/06 (MTR 2007 PTC) and decision of the UKE President of 26 April 
2007, DRTH-WKO-6042-10/06(12) (MTR 2007 PTK Centertel).
7 MTRs 2008 Decisions: decision of the UKE President of 30 September 2008, DHRT-
WKO-6042-6/08(11) (MTR 2008 Polkomtel); decision of the UKE President of 22 October 
2008, DHRT-WKO-6042-8/08(29), (MTR 2008 I PTC); decision of the UKE President of 30 
September 2008, DHRT- KO-6042-7/08(8) (MTR 2008 PTK Centertel).
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2009 and 30 June 2009 – 0,2162 PLN (ca. 0,05 EUR), from 01 July 2009 
onwards – 0,1677 PLN (ca. 0,04 EUR).
The UKE President did not claim in the MTRs 2008 Decisions that the 
lowering of the rates previously set was motivated by a change in the factual 
situation on Polish telecoms markets, a situation that would make it necessary 
to introduce lower rates than those set out in the MTRs 2007 Decisions. The 
NRA pointed instead to the need to protect the interests of end-users and 
effective market competition as the main reason for the issuance of the MTRs 
2008 Decisions. According to the NRA, these objectives would be achieved 
by ensuring maximum benefits with respect to diversity, price and quality of 
telecoms services, by further decreasing the MTRs and thus by creating the 
conditions necessary for effective competition. The UKE President stated 
also that this would lead to an elimination or reduction of fixed-to-mobile 
substitution whereby users resign from the use of fixed-line services in favour 
of mobile services. 
Interestingly, according to another document published on the NRA’s 
website, the decrease of the use of fixed-line services was reported to be 
caused by a high market penetration level of mobile operators. According to 
the respondents of a survey conducted by the Polish NRA, mobile services are 
better matched to the needs of their clients than fixed-lines services. The UKE 
President emphasised in this context that lowering the MTRs was beneficial to 
fixed-line operators but only on the condition that they would decrease their 
retail charges for fixed-to-mobile network connections. 
According to Article 15 PT, the UKE President should conduct a consultation 
procedure with the parties concerned prior to taking of a regulatory decision 
on MTRs. However, neither the 2007 nor the 2008 MTRs Decisions were 
preceded by consultations despite the fact that, the obligation to conduct them 
can be disregarded pursuant to Article 17 PT only in exceptional cases that 
require urgent actions. The decisions issued without a consultation cannot 
be binding for a period of time exceeding 6 months. Moreover, Article 17 
PT implements in fact Article 7(9)8 of the Framework Directive and thus the 
adoption of such interim decisions should therefore not only be fully justified 
but also notified to the Commission. 
Despite having an immediate effect, the MTRs 2008 Decisions decreasing 
the rates was not actually applied by the three aforementioned MNOs in 
their existing access and interconnection agreements, giving rise to disputes 
between mobile and fix operators. The UKE President issued therefore several 
‘interim’ decisions at the beginning of 2009 for the period of 6 months as 
defined in the PT and these decisions were subject to immediate executability. 
8 Previously Article 7(6) of the Framework Directive. 
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Such decisions modified telecoms access agreements between the individual 
operators as to MTR rate9. For example, in the Netia and GTS Energis cases, 
according to the UKE President, Netia and GTS Energis requested Polkomtel 
to amend their telecoms access agreements with respect to its MTR. At the 
request of these entities, the UKE President issued under Article 27 PT the 
requested decisions indicating a time limit for the conclusion of the necessary 
negotiations. Since the parties failed to reach an agreement in the specified 
time frame, Netia and GTS Energis applied for a separate regulatory decision 
to be issued by the UKE President amending their access agreements according 
to the annex attached to these applications. The UKE did not initially notify 
the Commission of its individual dispute settlement decisions but ultimately 
changed its approach in June 200910 and notified its decisions which set the 
MTRs level11.
The three MNOs appealed some of the interim decisions issued by the 
NRA to the Polish Court of Competition and Consumers Protection (in 
Polish: Sąd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów; hereafter, SOKiK) and to 
the Administrative Courts12. The judgments were inconsistent however and 
went into two directions13. Some of the contested regulatory decisions were 
repealed by Polish courts14; SOKiK stressed for instance that Article 17 PT 
 9 In particular with regard to Polkomtel, among others the following decisions were issued: 
a) decision of 21 January 2009 amending the agreement between GTS Energis sp. z o.o. and 
Polkomtel with respect to the change of MTR in public, mobile telephone network owned 
by Polkomtel; b) decision of 21 January 2009 amending the Network Integration Agreement 
between Netia S.A. and Polkomtel with respect to the change of MTR in public, mobile 
telephone network owned by Polkomtel; c) decision of 9 January 2009 amending the agreement 
between Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa sp. z o.o. (PTC) and Polkomtel with respect to the change 
of MTR; d) decision of 24 February 2009 amending Network Connection Agreement and the 
settlements rules concluded between Polska Telefonia Komórkowa Centertel sp. z o.o. (PTK 
Centertel) and Polkomtel with respect to the settlements conditions for MTR both in the PTK 
Centertel’s mobile network and Polkomtel’s mobile network.
10 Article 7 procedure under the Framework Directive of the EU telecoms rules 
(MEMO/09/539) requires NRAs to notify the Commission of their draft regulatory decisions 
in the telecoms markets.
11 See for example PL/2010/1027 by which UKE notified an individual dispute settlement 
of yet another new entrant MNO – AERO2.
12 Example: PTK Centertel sp. z o.o. appealed from MTR 2008 decision.
13 Order of the Supreme Administrative Court of 6 April 2011, II GSK 477/10; judgmet of 
the Supreme Administrative Court of 3 February 2011, II GSK 59/10; judgment of the Regional 
Administrative Court in Warsaw of 2 Decembr 2009, VI SA/Wa 591/09; judgment of the Court 
of Appeals in Warsaw of 12 January 2011, VI ACa 591/10.
14 Example: judgment of the Regional Administrative Court in Warsaw of 25 January 2011, 
VI SA/Wa 2359/10 (Polkomtel); judgment of the Regional Administrative Court in Warsaw of 
28 April 2011, VI SA/Wa 478/11; judgment of the Regional Administrative Court in Warsaw of 
30 March 2011, VI SA/Wa 1538/10; judgment of the Regional Administrative Court in Warsaw 
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has an exceptional character and cannot be overused. This provision makes it 
possible to issue a regulatory decision without prior consultation but only in 
exceptional cases where immediate actions are required by the direct threat 
to market competition or consumer interests. SOKiK judged that this was 
not the case in relation to the contested interim decisions. On the other hand 
however, some of the interim decisions issued in 2009 were in fact upheld. 
2. Consultation proceedings with respect to the drafts of UKE decisions
In March 2009, the UKE President informed relevant telecoms operators 
about the commencement of administrative proceedings in order to issue a 
regulatory decision (not ‘interim’ but ‘standard’ one) amending their telecoms 
access agreements. The NRA requested each of the parties to provide their 
standpoint on the draft regulatory decisions. The UKE President announced 
afterwards, under Article 16(1) PT, the commencement of consultation 
proceedings with respect to the draft decisions amending the agreements 
concluded between the MNOs and, among others, Multimedia Polska, 
GTS Energis, TP S.A. The drafts concerned the change in the MTRs to be 
applied in the mobile, public telephone network. These decisions were to be 
issued under Article 29 PT and Article 104(1) of the Act of 14 June 1960 
on the Administrative Procedure Code15 (in Polish: Kodeks Postępowania 
Administracyjnego; hereafter, KPA) and were immediately effective.
Under Article 61(4) KPA, the UKE President notified the parties about 
issuing a decision amending their access agreement with respect to MTRs 
2008 Decisions and asked them to provide their standpoi nts concerning the 
draft. In the opinion of the NRA, ex officio proceedings are a consequence 
of the above-mentioned interim decisions issued at the beginning of 2009, 
under Article 17 PT. They thus expire after July, August or September 2009 
(depending on the decision). The Polish NRA indicated also that it has decided 
ex officio to change the content of access agreements in order to protect from a 
threat to consumer interests and due to the need to establish effective market 
competition. 
None of these draft decisions were notified to the Commission. The UKE 
President was of the opinion that the setting of concrete MTRs does not 
constitute a new remedy but merely clarifies the implementation details of 
a previously imposed regulatory obligation. The NRA claimed additionally 
of 4 February 2011, VI SA/Wa 2614/10; judgment of the Regional Administrative Court in 
Warsaw of 16 February 2011, VI SA/Wa 1573/10; judgment of the Court of Appeals in Warsaw 
of 11 January 2011, VI ACa 784/10.
15 Journal of Laws 2000 No. 98, item 1071, as amended.
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that a decision relating to the setting of specific MTRs is not a regulatory 
decision subject to the EU notification duty. However, pursuant to the ruling 
of the Polish Supreme Administration Court of 31 May 2009, regarding 
the setting of MTRs, a decision of the UKE President issued on the basis 
of Article 40(4) PT is in fact a decision related to regulatory obligations16. 
Therefore, pursuant to Article 6 and 7 of the Framework Directive, the UKE 
President was indeed obliged to conduct a consultation procedure prior to its 
issuance as well as notify the draft to the Commission. The aforementioned 
judgment is consistent with the standpoint of the Commission according to 
which, the setting of MTRs (including the details or amendments to the glide 
path formulated by a NRA) constitutes a regulatory obligation as set forth in 
Article 18 PT and affects trade between EU Member States. With respect to 
the above, drafts of MTRs amendments should thus be notified to the NRAs 
of other Member States as well as to the European Commission. 
3. The second round review of the relevant market
In the second round review of the relevant market17, the UKE President 
identified the same three mobile operators (Polkomtel, PTC and PTK) as having 
SMP in the wholesale markets for voice call termination on their individual mobile 
networks18. Remedies were thus imposed on all three, including price control19. 
According to these decisions, the MTRs are set by the NRA on a yearly basis 
and based on the (actual) costs incurred by the individual operators. The UKE 
President proposed that from 1 January 2010, the rates previously determined 
in the MTR 2008 Decisions (0.1677 PLN, ca. EUR 0,04) shall continue to be 
used by all three MNOs. In its comments, the Commission highlighted the need 
to set MTRs with respect to efficient, rather than actual, costs and invited the 
Polish NRA to take account of its Termination Rates Recommendation. The 
Commission further invited the UKE President to define the MTRs applicable 
beyond 2010 sufficiently in advance so as to ensure transparency and legal 
certainty for the market. The UKE President imposed in decisions applied to P420 
16 Order of the Regional Administrative Court in Warsaw of 6 May 2008, VI SA/Wa 266/08.
17 Case PL/2009/0904.
18 SMP decisions 2009: decisions of the UKE President of 29 September 2009: DART-
SMP-6043-9/08(26) (Polkomtel);. DART-SMP-6040-4/09(33) (PTC); DART-SMP-6040-3/09(26) 
(PTK Centertel).
19 Case PL/2009/0991.
20 SMP decision of the UKE President of 18 December 2008, DART-SMP-6043-10/07(34) 
(P4 SMP Decision); furthermore P4 requested to change individual cooperation agreements 
with operators and at a request UKE issued on 26 June 2009 particular decisions: amending 
the MTR in cooperation agreement between P4 and PTC, DHRT-WWM-6080-29/09(35); 
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and CenterNet21 a glide path towards cost orientation on two further market 
entrants in the Polish mobile market: P422 and CenterNet23. However, in the 
case of CenterNet it was not based on a market analysis and a determination of 
CenterNet’s SMP.
4.  Asymmetric vs. symmetric MTRs oriented towards the costs of an efficient 
operator
The Polish NRA’s determination of the MTRs for small operators was not 
preceded24 by the establishment of their SMP but formulated within dispute 
resolution procedures conducted pursuant to the Article 27 PT. According to 
the comments submitted in this respect by the European Commission, the 
MTRs should be set in a general manner and applicable to interconnections 
between all operators, and not only those covered by the dispute settlements25. 
In fact, the UKE President did not regulate the MTRs charged by new entrants 
for calls originating in the networks of fixed operators in Poland as well as 
those from international fixed and mobile operators. National regulatory 
authorities, when carrying out their tasks, should ensure that no discrimination 
occurs in similar circumstances in the treatment of undertakings providing 
electronic communications networks and services. The costs of market entry 
and infrastructure roll out must, in any event, not be borne by competitors 
(by way of excessive termination rates) and ultimately their consumers. In the 
opinion of the UKE President, allowing new entrants to use higher MTRs 
enables them to build or develop their own infrastructure and catching up to 
operators with significant market power. New entrants could thus become able 
in the near future to render telecoms services through their own networks. 
amending the MTR in cooperation agreement between P4 and PTK Centertel, DHRT-
WWM-6080-116/09(22); decision as to MTR in cooperation agreement between TP S.A. and 
P4, DHRT-WWM-6080-123/09(24) and as to MTR in cooperation agreement between P4 and 
Polkomtel, DHRT-WWM-6080-38/09(45). 
21 The UKE issued SMP decision for CenterNet dated 28 February 2011, DART-
SMP-6040-14/09(19) (CenterNet SMP Decision); moreover for example UKE issued decision 
on 30 October 2009 amending the MTR in cooperation agreement between CenterNet and 
Polkomtel, DHRT-WWM-6080-129/09 (26). See: European Commission decision dated 22 
December 2010 as to case PL/2009/1021 and case PL/2010/1162. 
22 See cases PL/2008/0794 and PL/2009/0996. 
23 See case PL/2009/1021. The Commission invited UKE to impose cost orientation, and 
to revise the level of the asymmetry and recalled the need to notify the price levels under the 
consultation procedure.
24 Normally remedies are preceded by market analysis/SMP.
25 See comment made in case PL/2010/0961 in relation to price setting in dispute settlement.
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According to the Polish NRA, MTRs asymmetry helps new entrants and small 
operators to build up their own infrastructure. 
In 2008, the UKE President identified another MNO, P4, as having SMP26 
and imposed on it the following regulatory obligations: network access, non-
discrimination, transparency and non-excessive pricing. The NRA did not 
however impose on P4 the cost calculation obligation and thus, it is difficult 
to assess the meaning of ‘non-excessive’ pricing seeing as the UKE President 
is unlikely to have the necessary data on the costs of P427. In October 2009, 
the NRA notified the European Commission its draft decision proposing a 
glide path for P4 from asymmetric towards symmetric rates to be reached 
by 1 January 2014. The Commission invited the regulator to revise its price 
control methodology and the margin allowed for P4. It also recommended for 
a new glide path to be set for P4 which would result in lower MTRs, taking 
into account the need for P4 to become efficient over time.
The gradual decreasing of the MTRs has generally had a positive impact on 
the development of market competition and users in Poland. The regulatory 
aim was to decrease MTRs in order to lower retail tariffs. Ultimately, retail 
tariffs are lower thanks to strong competition between operators and MTRs 
asymmetry, which allows new entrants to cross-subsidise outgoing calls and/
or handsets to attract customers. The question arises, however, whether 
the additional financial resources made available to new entrants thanks 
to asymmetric MTRs are not only spend on ‘price war’ or whether they are 
actually also allocated to infrastructure developments. The first situation could 
be recognised as a cross-subsidy and could easily lead to potential frauds. 
MTR asymmetry influenced the development of competition and decreased 
the concentration level of Polish mobile telephone markets. It allowed new 
infrastructural operators, especially P4, to enter the market and rapidly gain 
subscribers despite the fact that the market was already saturated. The negative 
consequence of the use of MTR asymmetry was a possible cross-subsidisation 
that could result in frauds and confusions in retail tariffs. Moreover, because of 
the competition between the MNOs, it is necessary to carefully consider if, and 
for how long, should new entrants benefit from rates asymmetry. Preferential 
treatment in this respect should certainly not be automatically granted. 
CenterNet, Mobyland, Cyfrowy Polsat and Sferia, Aero2 are all new 
entrants on the Polish mobile market (the first three entered the market 
in 2008 and 2009). Some of these operators are planning to build up their 
own infrastructure and provide retail services in the near future based on 
commercial agreements for national roaming with one of the MNOs. However, 
26 Please see footnote 18 above. 
27 The cots analyses of new entrants MTRs are based on data being in the UKE possession 
concerning the other comparable operator. 
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CenterNet’s operations are based on Mobyland’s infrastructure. The UKE 
President decided to impose asymmetric MTRs so that new entrants may 
adopt higher prices than the MNOs - the latter must impose cost-oriented 
prices. However, market analysis has lead the UKE President to decide that 
operators that do not have their own access network infrastructure (full 
MVNOs) will charge (from 1 July 2011) equal rates as operator who offers 
them national roaming service (host MNOs). 
On 6 January 2011, the European Commission issued its decision, urging 
the Polish NRA to reconsider its approach. It is not the first time that the 
Commission criticized the UKE President for her actions regarding MTRs. 
The Commission questioned the automatism in assigning a four year 
asymmetry period and requested a rational assessment of the transitional 
period when asymmetry is in force. After the transitional period, MTRs of all 
operators should be symmetric and their level should mirror the costs of an 
efficient operator in line with the Termination Rates Recommendation. The 
Commission urged the UKE President to impose a cost-orientation obligation 
(cost-based prices) on new entrants and invited the NRA to carefully assess 
the level and duration of MTRs asymmetry granted to them in its forthcoming 
decisions. 
As stated in the Termination Rates Recommendation, MTRs applicable to 
new entrants may be subject to a higher unit cost for a transitional period, 
before the new entrants reach minimum efficiency, but only in justified 
situations based on a market analysis and cost calculation. Asymmetry should 
thus not be automatic. The Commission stated that four years might be a 
maximum reasonable time for new operators to recoup their set-up costs. 
Based on the dates when the new entrants became operational, MTRs 
asymmetry should thus come to an end in Poland in June 2012 in the case 
of Mobyland and CenterNet for instance. The Commission wants the UKE 
President to set cost-oriented MTRs for new entrants. In this respect, the 
NRA should demonstrate that the proposed level and duration of asymmetry 
corresponds to higher costs incurred by those operators. 
In the case of Aero2’s, an operator which was preparing its market entry but 
could not agree with other operators on MTRs level, the UKE President issued 
a dispute settlement decision based on Article 27 PT (instead of a regulatory 
decision assessing whether Aero2 holds SMP). The NRA argued that it could 
not analyze the market for call termination in Aero2’s network because the 
latter was not yet providing such services. The Commission commented that 
the measures proposed by the UKE President should be based on a forward-
looking analysis anticipating Aero2’s market entry. Therefore, the Commission 
urged the NRA to fix Aero2’s MTRs for a short, transitional period only and 
carry out a full market analysis for the termination of voice calls on Aero2’s 
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mobile network without delay. The Commission noted also that the UKE 
President intends to set the MTRs to be charged by Aero2 at 0,57 PLN/min 
(ca. 0,226 EUR), as requested by Aero2. This level is however well above the 
MTRs charged across Europe28 and would create a substantial asymmetry in 
comparison to other operators in Poland29. The NRA justifies its approach by 
Aero2’s need to finance the roll-out of its infrastructure and by the advantages 
for users linked to a further market entrant. However, the costs of market 
entry and infrastructure roll-out must not be borne by the competitors of the 
new entrant, by way of excessive termination rates, and thus ultimately, they 
should not burden consumers. 
It is worth mentioning that the actual level of Aero2’s termination rate is 
not only asymmetric but also significantly above the MTRs set for established 
MNOs in Poland. In some cases, it exceeds them by 170%.
5.  Two proposals notified by the UKE President to the Commission. 
Investment settlements between operators and the UKE President 
In March and April 2011, the Polish NRA notified the European 
Commission of two sets of draft decisions referring to the same subject. The 
first notification (first proposal) was assessed by the Commission between 
3 March and 4 April 2011. The UKE President notified therein its draft 
measures concerning the details of price control obligations imposed on the 
three aforementioned operators: Polkomtel, PTC and PTK Centertel which 
hold SMP in the markets for voice call termination on their individual mobile 
networks. On 5 April 2011, the Commission registered another notification 
(second proposal) by the Polish NRA concerning the UKE President’s 
approval of voluntary commitments submitted by four MNOs: Polkomtel, 
PTC, PTK Centertel as well as P4. The four operators committed themselves 
to make infrastructure invests in those Polish regions which were lacking 
mobile network coverage (white spots) due to an alleged lack of economic 
feasibility30. In exchange for the investment commitments, the four mobile 
28 Nevertheless this comment applies to all other aforementioned cases related to new 
entrance asymmetry.
29 C(2010)7039, Brussels, 6 October 2010.
30 Based on data provided by local authorities, the NRA estimates that ca. 300 000 people 
live in white spot areas in Poland. The areas not covered by mobile networks have been divided 
by the four operators so each operator is obliged to invest in specific areas – see C(2011) 3199, 
Brussels, 05 May 2011.
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operators were due to receive higher MTRs than those originally proposed 
under the first (recently submitted) notification31. 
In the first proposal, the MTRs for the original three MNOs were based on 
the costs actually incurred by PTK Centertel and Polkomtel in 2009 (the cost 
justification provided by PTC was rejected because the data was in the opinion 
of the NRA inaccurate and could not be used for price calculation purposes). 
On this basis, the UKE President established a symmetric termination rate 
of PLN 0.0966/min (ca. 0,025 EUR) applicable to all of the three major 
MNOs32. This tariff was supposed to be valid until the next approval of cost 
calculations submitted by these operators. If the NRA rejects the operators’ 
proposal, a new price decision would be issued by the UKE President33. 
Despite the Commission’s earlier comments, the Polish NRA’s approach 
was still based on costs actually incurred by individual operators (MNOs), 
or some not specified assumptions in the case of new entrants. However, the 
UKE President explained in response to the information request submitted 
by the Commission in line with the Termination Rates Recommendation, that 
a model that reflects the costs of an efficient operator will be adopted from 
1 January 2013.
In its comments to the draft decisions, the Commission said that the UKE 
President’s first proposal will lead to rates that seem to be getting closer to the 
cost of an efficient operator but are still based on the actual costs of individual 
operators. The Commission appreciated, however, that the Polish NRA 
proposes to adopt from 1 January 2013 a bottom up Long Run Incremental 
Cost model (BU-LRIC), in line with the Termination Rates Recommendation. 
The fact was also acknowledged that the UKE President plans to adopt 
consulted draft measures only where on-going negotiations with mobile 
operators concerning infrastructure investments would fail. The Commission 
stated in its comments that the NRA did not take into consideration the fact 
that the MTRs should be oriented towards the costs of an efficient operator. 
The use of actual costs incurred by the three MNOs, as well as the recovery 
of costs which are not incremental to the provision of wholesale termination 
31 Case PL/2011/1195.
32 The proposed rate for all three MNOs was calculated as an arithmetic average of the 
prices calculated for PTK and Polkomtel. PTC data was seen as inaccurate; see C(2011) 2477, 
Brussels, 4 April 2011.
33 MNOs are obliged to submit (every year) a justification of their MTRs level based on 
costs incurred, on the basis of data for the last year, not later than 120 calendar days from 
the end of the relevant year. If the UKE President considers that the MNOs’ calculations are 
incorrect, it may set the level of MTR, adjusting the cost calculations provided by the operators. 
Thus, the UKE President will issue prince decisions only as a result of incorrect calculations 
submitted by operators.
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services, can lead to distorted investment signals and higher prices for the 
originating operators and, consequently, their consumers.
Investment settlements between operators and the UKE President 
In parallel to the abovementioned first consultation procedure, the UKE 
President discussed with the MNOs whether, in exchange for a softer glide 
path for their MTRs, they would carry out infrastructural investments in 
those Polish regions where mobile network roll-out is seen as economically 
not feasible. The NRA stressed here that any draft measures concerning 
amendments of their regulatory obligations resulting from those discussions 
will be consulted at EU level prior to their adoption. Therefore, between 
January and June 2011, a number of meetings took place between the 
representatives of the Polish NRA, MNOs (Polkomtel, PTC, PTK Centertel, 
P4) and the representatives of the National Chamber of Commerce 
comprised mostly of fixed-line operators (KIGEiT). The purpose of these 
meetings was the drafting of a precise investment plan for Polish white spots 
and 3G network investments in unfeasible areas. Then, pursuant to Article 
43a PT, the operators requested the NRA to issue appropriate investment 
decisions. 
The UKE President notified the draft decisions to the Commission on 5 
April 2011 (second proposal). According to the NRA, the difference between 
the prices currently proposed and those previously consulted (first proposal), 
results from the additional costs to be incurred by the MNOs due to the 
roll-out of new infrastructure in Polish white spots. Therefore, also for the 
second notification, the UKE President considered that its proposed prices 
are cost-oriented. The Commission observes however that the prices proposed 
in the second notification for the period until 1 July 2012 were in fact 57% 
higher than the MTRs proposed by NRA only a month earlier. Despite that 
fact, the UKE President still argued that the proposed MTRs are cost-based 
in both cases.
In the Commission’s opinion the measures proposed by the Polish NRA 
are not in line with the Access Directive and fail to lead to MTRs that would 
be in line with the Termination Rates Recommendation34. According to the 
provisions of the Access Directive, obligations imposed on operators with 
SMP should be based on the nature of the identified problem, justified and 
proportionate in the light of the regulatory objectives expressed in Article 8 
of the Framework Directive. In its notification submitted in 200935, the UKE 
President did not explain the problem of insufficient network coverage in 
34 C(2011) 3558, Brussels, 16 May 2011.
35 Case PL/2009/0904.
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Poland. In the draft presented most recently, the NRA also failed to provide 
the Commission with evidence why it considers the change of the previously 
proposed MTRs justified and proportionate. 
The Commission pointed out that its Recommendation does not allow for 
the granting of higher MTRs to a select number of MNOs in return for any 
sort of commitments in particular, if this leads to a rate asymmetry in favour 
of such operators. It seems especially difficult to justify higher rates than the 
ones currently proposed, with objective cost differences outside the control 
of the operators concerned, which is one of the requirements for higher 
rates set in the Termination Rates Recommendation. It would appear that 
a commitment to invest in rural areas is within the control of the operators 
concerned36. 
Upon the request based on Article 43a PT and with regard to the second 
proposal notified to the Commission, the UKE President ultimately issued 
a new set of MTRs decisions for PTK Centertel and Polkomtel setting their 
MTR at 0,1520 PLN (ca. 0,038 EUR). These decisions were issued upon 
their declaration to invest in telecoms infrastructure in Polish white spots 
(rural areas). The KIGEiT’s approval of such investment decisions was also 
needed and subjected to the withdrawal of pending appeals against previous 
MTRs decisions. The new decisions were thus eventually issued based upon 
the operators’ commitment to withdraw their appeals against earlier UKE 
decisions, which questioned the MTRs previously set by the NRA. Nevertheless, 
PTC did not agree to such a conditional decision. Therefore, on 27 May 2011, 
the UKE President directed to it a decision based on the first proposal notified 
to the Commission and set PTC’s MTRs on the level of 0,0966 PLN/min (ca. 
0,025 EUR) with effect from 1 July 2011. PTC strongly opposed that decision 
as it would lead to a massive asymmetry between the three largest MNOs – 
asymmetry not supported by any mandatory cost calculation or regulatory 
justification. After further negotiations, a settlement between the NRA and 
PTC was finally reached and the UKE President issued on 29 June 2011 yet 
another new decision, subsequently withdrawing its earlier decision. 
The MTR decision for PTC is now consistent with those issued for the 
two largest Polish mobile operators – PTK Centertel and Polkomtel. They 
all set their MTRs at 0,1520 PLN/min between 1 July 2011 and 30 June 
2012 and 0,1223 PLN/min from 1 July 2012. It is worth noting that the 
Commission clearly stated that its MTR Recommendation does not allow 
for the granting of higher MTRs to a select number of MNOs in return for 
any sort of commitments (e.g. infrastructure investments), in particular if this 
leads to asymmetry in rates in favor of such operators. Moreover, NRA, when 
36 C(2011) 2477, Brussels, 4 April 2011.
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carrying out their tasks, should ensure that in similar circumstances there 
is no discrimination in the treatment of undertakings providing electronic 
communications networks and services. 
Approximately four weeks have passed since the issue of the asymmetric 
MTRs decisions concerning the three largest MNOs in Poland. Apparently, the 
UKE President was both willing and able to establish different MTRs among 
almost equal competitors, which would cause massive market disturbances. 
Moreover, the NRA notified the Commission two different regulatory 
proposals concerning the very same subject but with different MTRs each: 
(i) 0,0966 PLN and (ii) 0,1520 PLN. Not only that, the decisions ultimately 
issued by the Polish NRA were based on a mixed approach that related to both 
notifications. It means that the UKE President had notified the Commission 
two sets of hypothetical decisions with the purpose to ultimately choose, upon 
its own discretion, one or two of them simultaneously and apply to operators. 
As a result, the hybrid decisions ultimately issued were never notified to the 
Commission. More importantly, in none of its two sets of notifications did 
the Polish NRA consult with the Commission, or in fact with other NRAs, its 
intention to impose asymmetric MTRs among equal operators. Such situation 
could be considered a potential infringement of Article 7 of the Framework 
Directive. 
IV. Consequences of calculating MTR in European law
The European Commission issued an opinion to the UKE President 
commenting on its MTRs calculating methods. Pursuant to the Termination 
Rates Recommendation of 2009, termination rates should be set at the cost 
level which would be faced by an efficient operator providing the relevant 
service. The Commission recommended furthermore that the NRAs apply a 
long run incremental costs (LRIC) methodology for setting termination rates 
by the end of 2012.
In its opinion sent to the UKE President, the Commission indicated that 
the methodology chosen by the Polish NRA (charges based on costs incurred) 
does not promote efficiency and therefore could only be considered a short-
term solution. The Commission invited the UKE President to follow the 
costing approach recommended by the Commission so as to apply (from 
31 December 2012) MTRs set according to the methodology set out in the 
Recommendation. 
The Commission also reminded the Polish NRA that if it did decide to 
impose price regulation on the basis of a comparison with the pricing structure 
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found in other countries, it should carefully select the objective criteria and 
clearly justify the reasons for which it believes that the relevant market(s) in 
the chosen countries are most suited as the basis for such comparison, taking 
into account the differences between the conditions prevailing on the relevant 
market(s) in these countries and its home market.
The Commission indicated also that pursuant to the Framework Directive, 
when a NRA considers a change to the current MTRs level, it is required to 
notify that fact to the Commission and the NRAs of other Member States 
in order to ensure that regulatory decisions taken at national level do not 
have an adverse effect on the single market. Moreover, under Commission 
Recommendation 2008/850/EC37, price levels, amendments to the methodology 
used to calculate costs or prices as well as the determination of glide-paths are 
all considered to be material changes to the nature or scope of a regulatory 
remedy that have an appreciable impact on the market and should therefore 
be notified following the standard notification procedure.
V. Conclusions
1. Calculating MTRs internationally
There is no single approach towards MTRs among the countries. Some 
only regulate MTRs for fixed-to-mobile calls. In others, mobile networks are 
required to apply a single regulated termination charge regardless of where 
the call terminates. In many countries, there is still much debate about the 
appropriate level of interconnection rates. In the United States for example, 
MTRs are generally much lower than in the EU. Operators are free to 
negotiate rates as long as they are symmetric. Moreover, fixed-line incumbents 
are required to set cost-based termination rates. This system results in low 
or even non-existent (zero) termination rates. In such a case however, users 
usually pay for incoming calls. 
Looking at the situation in the EU market, it is interesting to analyze the 
case of Slovakia. Its NRA has issued its methodology for calculating MTRs 
whereby operators are obliged to calculate their interconnection charges 
based on the fully allocated historical cost model proposed by the regulator, 
which by the way is subject to numerous appeals by Slovak mobile operators. 
37 Commission Recommendation 2008/850/EC of 15 October 2008 on notifications, time 
limits and consultations provided for in Article 7 of Directive 2002/21/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services, OJ [2008] L 301/23.
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The European Commission has welcomed the Slovenian NRA’s revision of its 
MTRs regulation, eliminating asymmetries therein, adopting an appropriate 
benchmarking method, and developing a forward-looking cost model of its 
own for setting regulated prices to be used in the future. The European 
Commission has criticised on the other hand a German proposal for the 
regulation of call termination rates until November 2012. The Commission 
objected here to the use of: asymmetric rates, the inclusion of the spectrum 
into the cost methodology and the exclusion of MVNOs. The UK telecoms 
regulator, Ofcom, has launched a consultation on MTRs. The proposal aims to 
cut the rates by close to 90% by 2015, to as low as 0.5 pence per minute, while 
applying symmetric rates across all five active market operators from 2012.
2. Conduct contrary to EU regulations
The UKE President’s conduct may, for various reasons, be treated as not 
compliant with the Commission Termination Rates Recommendation. First, 
MTRs should be set according to the costs of an efficient operator and not 
cost actually incurred by the regulated operators. In addition, the convergence 
of MTRs should be finished by the end of 2012, henceforth symmetric rates 
should apply. It is also worth remembering that according to the Access 
Directive, exceptions to the obligation to conduct consultation proceedings 
before issuing a regulatory decision should be used in limited and justified 
situations only. Finally, market entry and infrastructure roll-out costs must 
never be borne by competitors (by way of excessive termination rates) and 
ultimately their consumers.
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